Regulating Big Tech : policy responses to digital dominance / Martin Moore and Damian Tambini.

Por: Colaborador(es): Tipo de material: TextoTextoEditora: New York, NY : Oxford University Press, 2022Edição: 1 EditionDescrição: 368 pTipo de conteúdo:
  • text
Tipo da mídia:
  • computer
Tipo de armazenamento:
  • online resource
ISBN:
  • 9780197616130
  • 9780197616116
  • 9780197616123
Assunto(s): Formatos físicos adicionais: Print version:: Regulating Big TechClassificação Decimal de Dewey:
  • 338.476205 23
Classificação da LoC:
  • HC79.H53
Sumário: "The market size and strength of the major digital platform companies has invited international concern about how such firms should best be regulated to serve the interests of wider society, with a particular emphasis on the need for new anti-trust legislation. Using a normative innovation systems approach, this paper investigates how current anti-trust models may insufficiently address the value-extracting features of existing data-intensive and platform-oriented industry behaviour and business models. To do so, we employ the concept of economic rents to investigate how digital platforms create and extract value. Two forms of rent are elaborated: 'network monopoly rents' and 'algorithmic rents.' By identifying such rents more precisely, policymakers and researchers can better direct regulatory investigations, as well as broader industrial and innovation policy approaches, to shape the features of platform-driven digital markets"-- Provided by publisher.
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"The market size and strength of the major digital platform companies has invited international concern about how such firms should best be regulated to serve the interests of wider society, with a particular emphasis on the need for new anti-trust legislation. Using a normative innovation systems approach, this paper investigates how current anti-trust models may insufficiently address the value-extracting features of existing data-intensive and platform-oriented industry behaviour and business models. To do so, we employ the concept of economic rents to investigate how digital platforms create and extract value. Two forms of rent are elaborated: 'network monopoly rents' and 'algorithmic rents.' By identifying such rents more precisely, policymakers and researchers can better direct regulatory investigations, as well as broader industrial and innovation policy approaches, to shape the features of platform-driven digital markets"-- Provided by publisher.

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